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Combined summary - A "Free" Relay Attack Taking Advantage of The Lack of Full-RBF In Core

Combined summary - A "Free" Relay Attack Taking Advantage of The Lack of Full-RBF In Core

The discourse among Bitcoin developers, notably between Antoine Riard and Peter Todd, sheds light on a critical security vulnerability within the Bitcoin network related to transaction relays and double-spending.

The vulnerability hinges on exploiting nodes with full Replace-By-Fee (RBF) disabled, allowing for an attack where low fee-rate transactions are initially broadcast across the majority of the network and subsequently double-spent with higher fees to a single miner. This scenario underlines a fundamental issue in the network's design, where the relay and acceptance policies of nodes can be manipulated to waste bandwidth and potentially disrupt transaction integrity.

Antoine's critique extends to the broader Bitcoin Core team's response—or lack thereof—to such vulnerabilities. Despite proposing solutions like enabling full RBF by default, which could mitigate multiple known issues including this specific vulnerability, such suggestions have been ignored or dismissed due to what appears to be political reasons within the development community. This reluctance to adopt straightforward fixes raises concerns about the prioritization of political over technical considerations in addressing security vulnerabilities.

Furthermore, the discussion delves into the ineffectiveness of TRUC/V3 transactions as proposed in BIP-431. Despite being positioned as a solution to certain types of "free" relay attacks, the rationale behind TRUC/V3 is criticized for failing to address the underlying issues effectively. This situation highlights a misallocation of resources towards solutions that do not fully mitigate the identified risks, thereby perpetuating vulnerabilities within the network.

The communication also emphasizes the economic feasibility of executing such attacks, pointing out that attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities at minimal cost. This underscores a significant inefficiency within the Bitcoin protocol that could be exploited for nefarious purposes, including low-cost transaction consolidation by attackers.

This dialogue underscores the complexity of managing security vulnerabilities within open-source cryptocurrency projects like Bitcoin. It reveals a tension between the need for technical solutions to secure the network and the political dynamics that influence decision-making processes within the developer community. The highlighted correspondence and proposals call for a reassessment of priorities, advocating for a more responsive and technically grounded approach to safeguarding the integrity and efficiency of the Bitcoin network.

Discussion History

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Peter ToddOriginal Post
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