bitcoin-dev

A "Free" Relay Attack Taking Advantage of The Lack of Full-RBF In Core

A "Free" Relay Attack Taking Advantage of The Lack of Full-RBF In Core

Original Postby Antoine Riard

Posted on: July 18, 2024 23:04 UTC

Antoine raises a question regarding the timeline between privately reporting an issue to the bitcoin-security mailing list and its public disclosure, suggesting a few weeks' leeway for the vendor team to provide a substantial response, unless in emergencies.

This approach stems from previous discussions and emphasizes the importance of giving time for coordinated mitigation efforts. Antoine expresses concern over Peter Todd's administrative removal from the bitcoin-security mailing list by Achow, seeking an explanation from Achow on this decision. Given Antoine's respect and trust in Achow as a Bitcoin Core maintainer and a professional in security report coordination, this incident has led to doubts about sharing future security-sensitive information with Achow or the bitcoin core team.

Regarding the "free relay" attack, Antoine believes that Peter Todd's explanation could be enhanced by detailing the mining topology and policy defaults that make this exploit possible, including how transactions are propagated across the network. The efficiency of the attack, according to Antoine, seems to depend significantly on the miner's hash rate resources, which affects transaction broadcast bandwidth waste. While not considering the example involving an exchange as the most illustrative of potential risks, Antoine acknowledges its value as a foundation for researching other attack types.

Antoine also reflects on the development and skepticism surrounding V3/TRUC as a mitigation measure for transaction pinning issues affecting Lightning funds' security. Initially an advocate for implementing new policy rules to address these concerns, Antoine's stance has shifted due to emerging complications such as replacement cycling issues and the evolving understanding of mining game theory. He now views V3/TRUC as an insufficient solution, likening it to a temporary fix pending a more effective design. The discussion extends to the broader context of implementing less-than-ideal solutions in Bitcoin, like BIP37, which have revealed increasing weaknesses over time.

The debate on whether TRUC/V3 introduces new attack vectors hinges on miners' willingness to adopt these changes based on their impact on mining revenue. Antoine notes that disabling this feature is currently as simple as modifying a single line of code.

In summary, Antoine's correspondence delves into the dynamics of security issue reporting within the Bitcoin community, the implications of administrative actions on trust and information sharing, and the technical complexities of mitigating security vulnerabilities. The conversation underscores the need for careful consideration and collaboration in addressing security challenges in cryptocurrency technologies.