bitcoin-dev

A "Free" Relay Attack Taking Advantage of The Lack of Full-RBF In Core

A "Free" Relay Attack Taking Advantage of The Lack of Full-RBF In Core

Original Postby David Harding

Posted on: July 30, 2024 04:57 UTC

In the ongoing discussion about TRUC and its implications for Bitcoin's network, several key points emerge regarding its impact on full node operators, including miners, volunteer relay node operators, and protocol users.

The comparison between TRUC and RBFR reveals that TRUC presents a more straightforward case for assessing impacts on mining profitability and relay behavior. However, when it comes to evaluating potential pinning attacks against the Lightning Network (LN), the complexity of such analyses increases due to the intricate nature of LN and its interaction with multiple protocol layers.

The debate extends into the responsibilities of Bitcoin Core developers concerning the safety of features like BIP431 TRUC for downstream projects such as LN. It's argued that while developers aim to enhance safety, the primary responsibility for ensuring the security of these features within their applications lies with the downstream developers. This is particularly true for new mechanisms like imbued TRUC, which should not replace existing dependencies without consensus from relevant stakeholders.

A detailed exploration of a hypothetical pinning attack, termed "loophole pinning," underscores the nuanced challenges in protecting against such strategies. The attack involves complex maneuvers including guessing future fee rates, managing UTXO spending across multiple channels, and strategically broadcasting transactions to exploit mempool behaviors. The potential effectiveness of this attack hinges on accurately predicting fee rates over a significant block span and the ability of counterparts to counteract profit opportunities through specific transactional responses.

Further discussions touch upon alternative solutions like one-shot RBFR and proposed expansions of TRUC aimed at mitigating pinning risks by requiring fee bumps to enter the top portion of the mempool. These suggestions indicate an ongoing search for robust defenses against pinning while acknowledging the limitations of current methods such as CPFP-CO. The dialogue concludes with an acknowledgment of TRUC's interim utility until a more conclusive solution is developed, emphasizing the need for continual improvement and possibly consensus changes to address these challenges effectively. For further details, the conversation references a GitHub comment providing additional context to the discussion.