Posted by Keagan McClelland
May 7, 2020/04:07 UTC
The discussion revolves around the security model of Bitcoin and how it can be compromised by consensus capture. The idea is that as more light clients outpace full nodes, the costs of security are being shifted from light clients onto full nodes, making it harder for them to run. This could potentially lead to a net increase in light clients and a redistribution of load onto a smaller surface area, which is an unstable process. As node counts drop, the set of node operators will increasingly represent economic actors with extreme weight, whose interests may diverge from the population at large, and who can be coerced into behavior they otherwise wouldn't. It is easier to find agents carrying lots of economic weight, so we should be wary of consensus capture by exchanges or HNWI's as well as miners.One of the solutions proposed is to have light clients explicitly choose their full node tethers and pick their trusted source. This way, many light clients can work off a family node, and peer services could be limited to some sort of "authenticated" peers. This limits the amount of costs that can be externalized properly without exposing the risk of consensus capture by economically weighty institutions. However, there are concerns about the attack scenario on topology and deployment, which requires miners' nodes to be connected to clients to feed directly the invalid headers. If these clients are connected to headers/filters gateways doing full-node validation, the invalid chain is going to be sanitized out. The concern is having multiple connections to these gateways and diversifying enough to avoid collusion between gateways/chain access providers/miners. Finally, the discussion also touches on the trust-minimization of Bitcoin security model, which has always relied first and above on running a full node. The current paradigm cannot be shifted because it would compromise Bitcoin itself, which depends on the assumption that a supermajority of the economy is verifying their incoming transactions using their own full node. All efforts to improve the "full node-less" experience are harmful and should be actively avoided, according to some participants in the discussion.
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