Censorship Resistant Transaction Relay - Taking out the garbage(man)

The discourse surrounding Bitcoin's resistance to censorship and the effectiveness of measures aimed at mitigating spam transactions in the mempool reveals a complex interplay of technical challenges and differing philosophies within the community. The crux of the argument centers on the distinction between objective and subjective criteria for determining the legitimacy of transactions, particularly in light of potential governmental interventions. Governments, perceived as one distinct group with its own interests, could potentially employ strategies like creating a larger version of Garbageman—a theoretical tool designed to disrupt the mempool by filtering out transactions deemed undesirable. This scenario underscores the inherent tension between the desire for an uncensorable digital currency and the practical realities of maintaining a functional, decentralized system in the face of external threats.

The debate further delves into the specifics of how proposed countermeasures against mempool spam might function in practice, with a critical examination of their actual efficacy. Questions are raised about the percentage of "spam" transactions effectively blocked and the average delays imposed on transaction processing times. The concept of "rate limiting" is scrutinized, with arguments suggesting that simply delaying the propagation of transactions does not genuinely limit the rate at which they are eventually included in blocks. Moreover, the discussion highlights the adaptability of adversaries, who, in response to initial blockages, may simply employ more sophisticated tactics to ensure their transactions reach miners, such as utilizing additional Libre relay peers or establishing more nodes.

The conversation also touches upon the economic dimensions of the problem, noting the monetary incentives that both miners and issuers of scam tokens have to circumvent any transaction filtering mechanisms. This dynamic suggests that without substantial financial investment in effective countermeasures, those opposed to spam may find themselves at a disadvantage in what could become an escalating arms race against malicious actors. The mention of Ocean's proactive offer of "Core" templates serves as a testament to the ongoing efforts to address these challenges, albeit with an acknowledgment of the limitations posed by the cost-effectiveness of running nodes.

Ultimately, the dialogue encapsulates a broader critique of the current approaches to managing spam in the Bitcoin network. It posits that even if a method like Garbageman were to achieve a significant delay in the inclusion of transactions in blocks, it might inadvertently incentivize direct submissions to miners, thereby enhancing their profitability and potentially leading to greater centralization in mining operations. This outcome is presented as contrary to the objectives of reducing spam and limiting transaction rates, highlighting the intricate balance between fostering innovation in countermeasures and addressing the fundamental goals of decentralization and censorship resistance within the Bitcoin ecosystem.