Censorship Resistant Transaction Relay - Taking out the garbage(man)

The discussion centers around the technical aspects and implications of Libre Relay nodes in the Bitcoin network, particularly focusing on their interaction with the so-called "garbageman" nodes. The primary concern is whether Libre Relay nodes can effectively identify and connect with one another without relying on a specific service bit, which has been exploited by garbageman nodes to perform sybil attacks. The argument made is that the original method of using a service bit for Libre Relay node identification inadvertently facilitated these attacks, undermining the network's resilience.

A proposed mechanism for Libre Relay nodes to find each other involves the advertisement of the total fees for the next double block, assuming all nodes support this method. This scenario presupposes the absence of a Libre Relay service bit, rendering garbageman nodes irrelevant to the peering process. The reasoning here is straightforward: nodes either truthfully advertise the transaction fees they intend to propagate, or they face being banned from the network for dishonesty. This method hinges on the premise that there will always be a sufficient volume of Libre Relay transactions generating noticeable differences in advertised fees, thus influencing peering decisions.

Furthermore, an analysis based on network dynamics suggests that even under conservative estimates—a significant outnumbering of Libre Relay-friendly nodes by those indifferent or hostile to such policies—the time required for a Libre Relay node to discover a peer it can work with is manageable. Assuming a scenario where only 40 out of 40,000 nodes are Libre Relay-compatible (a ratio of 1000:1), it would take approximately 1.4 days for a connection to be established under average conditions. This timeframe could be reduced by simultaneously attempting to establish connections with multiple peers.

This discussion is enriched with a technical breakdown provided by the sender, illustrating the practicality of the approach and its potential to mitigate the risk posed by sybil attacks without compromising the integrity of node peering within the Bitcoin network.