Posted by Saint Wenhao
Mar 18, 2026/05:24 UTC
The discussion revolves around the potential future risks associated with RIPEMD-160 collisions in the context of Bitcoin's security and address format. The concern is raised that after approximately 2^80 operations, there could be a feasible risk of encountering a collision with 160-bit hashes, suggesting that these may become unsafe over time. This brings about a consideration for the adoption of 256-bit hashes, as they would not only provide enhanced security but also maintain the same size when incorporating an x-value public key.
Furthermore, the conversation touches upon an innovative use of potential RIPEMD-160 collisions within Pay to Script Hash (P2SH) addresses, which could be termed as "wrapped Taproot." This method would allow for different scripts to be used by parties to spend coins from the same P2SH address without the need to construct a Merkle Abstract Syntax Tree (MAST). Specifically, it is proposed that Alice and Bob could employ distinct scripts, such as "<pubkeyA> OP_CHECKSIG" and "<time> OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY OP_DROP <pubkeyB> OP_CHECKSIG" respectively. If both scripts are processed through HASH160 and result in the same 160-bit output, it would enable each party to use a different script for transactions involving the same P2SH address. This concept illustrates a creative workaround to utilize older addresses while potentially simplifying the transaction process and enhancing flexibility in script usage.
Thread Summary (12 replies)
Mar 16 - Mar 16, 2026
13 messages • 12 replies
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