One suggestion is to limit the maximum node size with enforced minimum liquidity requirements per channel. Another proposal is to use OpenTimeStamps for self-attestation, which has a low risk of being coordinated against by an attacker. However, the risk of a minority OTS-server censoring specific nodes remains a possibility. Additionally, proof-of-uptime may not be enough to ensure node correct behavior since it only measures uptime. The issue is presented in the fable of the rat-tail program, where measuring the number of rat tails shown does not necessarily lead to the reduction of rats in the city. Finally, there are suggestions to make proof-of-uptime more expensive and to require groups of independent citizens to put a fund in a k-of-n address and continuously spend that address to themselves on every block, with the proof-of-uptimes of the group embedded in a Merkle tree committed to in the R of the signature.