This scenario arises particularly if the coinbase transaction is exactly 64 bytes in size. Although executing such an attack with a coinbase transaction involves additional complexities, notably the need to brute-force an extra 40 bits at the initial stage, it is highlighted as an impractical but potential risk.

An alternative mitigation strategy proposed involves implementing a soft fork that introduces a commitment to tree depth. However, this approach is critiqued on two main fronts. Firstly, it is seen as a convoluted method for addressing the vulnerability instead of directly tackling the root cause, which is the inability to distinguish 64-byte transactions from inner nodes within the protocol's design. Secondly, this solution would necessitate miners to update their software stacks, contrasting with a simpler remedy that entails invalidating 64-byte transactions, which would require no changes for operators running standard configurations of Bitcoin Core.

The discussion evolves into comparing the complexity of various solutions. On one hand, ensuring that transactions, once stripped of witness information, are not 64 bytes and verifying their Merkle path's validity is suggested. On the other, validating the reconstituted coinbase Merkle path alongside maintaining consistent Merkle depth for any transaction within a block presents an alternative route. It is noted that applications primarily concerned with verifying SPV proofs for incoming payments would inherently sidestep this vulnerability by only inspecting transactions directed to standard scriptpubkey addresses, thereby implicitly avoiding transactions that are 64 bytes long. This discourse illuminates the nuanced trade-offs between implementing direct fixes versus more systemic updates to the blockchain's operational rules, underscoring the ongoing evolution of security measures within digital currency systems.