Mempool Incentive Compatibility

Mempool Incentive Compatibility

Original Postby instagibbs

Posted on: March 18, 2024 18:16 UTC

The discussion revolves around the complexity and potential vulnerabilities associated with stackable transactions, particularly in the context of blockchain technology.

This area is highlighted as a significant concern due to the ease with which an attacker could exploit the system by coordinating multiple channels to pin down transactions. The challenge lies in the collective action required to outbid such an attack, which may not be feasible due to the high level of interactivity required.

Furthermore, the scenario describes a situation where miners, who play a crucial role in transaction verification and inclusion in the blockchain, might opt to include transactions that evict pins even if they understand that doing so might not be beneficial on a pairwise basis. This decision could stem from a precautionary stance against potential denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, indicating a conflict between maintaining network integrity and preventing abuse.

The proposed solution involves introducing a mechanism for future discounting applied to diagram checks, which would allow for a more equitable comparison of diagrams during these evaluations. Such an approach aims to delineate clearly between incentives for network participants and measures to prevent DoS attacks. By separating these considerations, it becomes possible to explore alternative strategies for mitigating DoS risks without compromising the efficiency or security of the transaction processing system. This idea suggests a path forward in addressing the challenges of stackable transactions by enhancing the framework within which these transactions are assessed and managed.