[Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards : preventing miner's deviation when the Bitcoin rewards is zero

He raises concerns about the potential decrease in miners' profitability due to the reduction in block rewards, which may not be offset by corresponding rises in Bitcoin prices. This decrease could critically affect the security framework of Bitcoin when block rewards are no longer available, prompting a need for strategies to mitigate possible deviations by miners from expected behaviors. Lee identifies a threshold, termed G_t, which could indicate shifts in miner behavior within the network. His analysis suggests that significant deviations among miners could arise not only from changes in block rewards but also from other factors. In scenarios where only transaction fees fund miners—a purely fee-based regime—deviations could occur with fees as low as 0.17% of transaction values.

The idea of implementing a floor fee is analyzed as a feasible solution compatible with soft-forking techniques. A more definitive resolution might include combining tail emission with an EIP-1559 style fee burn and priority tipping. This hybrid approach could balance various aspects of transaction fees and network sustainability in blockchain technology. For a more detailed examination of these concepts, you can view the original content here. The feedback on the paper reflects a positive reception and an eagerness for further discussions, suggesting that the topic could significantly influence future developments or insights in the field.

Critiques of Lee’s findings highlight the static nature of his hash power model, suggesting it fails to account for dynamic changes in mining power or potential strategic behaviors such as entry and exit from the mining market. A more dynamic and layered strategy for securing the network is proposed, emphasizing the importance of reserve capacities that remain undisclosed but can be mobilized in response to attacks. This 'elastic' defense strategy is based on deterring through ambiguity, complicating the attackers’ cost calculations due to unknown defensive reserves. Additionally, enhancing observability within the network is advocated to ensure blocks must be widely witnessed and verified before acceptance into the chain, proposing mechanisms such as value-scaled confirmation depth and witnessed propagation as validity conditions.

In responding to critiques regarding the realism and scope of his theoretical paper, Junhyuk acknowledges the validity of the suggestions but expresses caution about broadening the scope too quickly due to the potential complexity it introduces. The discussion hints at a redefinition of the paper's focus to clearly state its conservative approach, ensuring readers understand its theoretical nature. Cameron’s critique particularly points out that the static modeling of mining operations neglects potential threats like Sybil attacks, which become more feasible when block creation is cheap. He recommends incorporating the stake of the system as a crucial factor in maintaining security and advocates for a stake-dependent security model. Furthermore, a dynamic model of mining capacity utilizing "dark capacity"—a reserve activated as necessary—is suggested to adapt to varying needs and conditions, potentially enhancing efficiency and responsiveness. Lastly, the recommendation that block confirmation in later stages should depend on costliness of production and recognition by trusted parties underlines the importance of considering both economic and social dimensions of blockchain security.