This strategy involves the attacker engaging in what can be described as stalling transactions by making one bid per block. This approach necessitates that the attacker incurs costs similar to those seen in replacement cycling attacks. However, this method is perceived as having limited effectiveness for several reasons.

Firstly, the nature of this attack allows for it to be countered with relative ease and at a minimal expense to the defender, even without the need for detailed mempool knowledge. The inherent weakness of this attack stems from its economic inefficiency for the perpetrator. Essentially, the cost dynamics at play can swiftly turn the expected value (EV) of the attack negative for the attacker. This shift to negative EV not only undermines the financial viability of the attack but also serves as a deterrent against its initiation.

The discussion highlights a critical aspect of blockchain security where the economic structure and incentives can significantly influence the feasibility and attractiveness of potential attacks. By understanding the underlying economics, defenders can more effectively protect against such strategies, reinforcing the security of blockchain systems. The emphasis on the attacker's cost and the potential for a quick shift to negative EV provides valuable insight into how economic principles are integral to maintaining blockchain security.