Regarding the possibility of eliminating script requirements in interactive cases, it is noted that while Ark attempts to remove covenant requirements in favor of interactivity, this may not be feasible for all scenarios, especially when an operator becomes unresponsive. The debate then moves to the intricacies of fraud proofs where user withdrawals are concerned. Specifically, when multiple user:balance pairs are involved, a more complex verification process is necessary due to multiple leaves in the Merkle tree being considered simultaneously.

A proposed solution is to use MATT generic fraud proof protocols or an ad-hoc protocol to streamline the process. In particular, the ad-hoc protocol would allow for a dispute resolution with minimal transaction rounds. The protocol's execution involves an initial claim of total balance by a user, followed by on-chain disclosure of individual balances if disputed. This methodology would typically only proceed beyond the initial claim in instances of fraud accusations. For large sets of users, alternative methods such as representing the set as a bitmap could prove more efficient than posting all user balances on-chain.

The conversation also covers the strategy for dividing pools in the event of a challenge, specifically addressing fraud prevention measures. In such cases, it is suggested that half of the disputed funds should go to the challenger and the other half should be burned. This method deters sybil attacks by making collusion too costly for perpetrators. Furthermore, the importance of accurate financial representation in light of suspected fraud is emphasized. It is argued that without clear evidence to validate the legitimacy of funds, calculations should exclude any amounts that are in question, ensuring that estimations are not artificially inflated by potentially fraudulent assets.

Finally, the email touches on the issue of economically viable exits from layer 2 (L2) systems for users with small balances. The proposed solution involves allowing multiple users to combine their low-value holdings and execute a single withdrawal through an optimistic withdrawal protocol backed by fraud proofs. This protocol would require users to make a claim, post a bond, and wait through a challenge period before collecting their funds, thus incentivizing honest behavior. Additionally, the concept of optimistic aggregated withdrawal is introduced, where an intermediary facilitates the withdrawal process on behalf of a group of users, again subject to a time-locked challenge period. The goal is to create a system that encourages cooperation among users and intermediaries, maintains consistent cost structures, and minimizes fraud risks. However, several challenges remain, including defining non-custodial roles for intermediaries and refining the withdrawal protocol to accommodate a varying number of users. Despite these ongoing concerns, the approach shows promise and invites further development and feedback.