The consideration of applying potentially confiscatory consensus rules initially to relay/mining policy is highlighted as a strategy to mitigate risk. This approach presupposes that if no complaints arise and there's an absence of rule-violating transactions over a significant period, the risk associated with these patches—deemed "anti-features"—is minimized, albeit not entirely eliminated. The argument suggests that the relative benefit of employing a transitory soft fork for transaction layer cleanup is marginal, given the already reduced risk levels.

The text further explores the notion that feature additions via soft forks, unlike cleanup efforts, offer a distinct proposition. It underscores the possibility of emulating almost any proposed feature through trusted third-party intervention, either directly on Bitcoin or via an intermediary mechanism such as a sidechain. However, it acknowledges a lack of widespread adoption for this emulation capability, attributing it to a dichotomy within the user base: individuals comfortable with third-party trust opt to keep their funds on exchanges and have limited demand for new features, whereas those wary of third-party reliance show interest only in features that ensure trustlessness.

A strong case is made for utilizing transitory soft forks for introducing new features that meet technical standards and enjoy community support but face opposition due to uncertainties or concerns that cannot be immediately resolved. Such an approach allows for the trustless utilization of these features without committing permanently, offering a compromise solution. Despite this, the author notes a lack of willingness among both proponents and critics to adopt this method for current proposals, possibly due to reluctance in facing future contention based on new evidence or insights.

In conclusion, the discussion raises a critical point regarding the broader applicability of transitory soft forks. It questions the selective use of such forks for either cleanup or feature introduction, suggesting that a consistent approach—either employing transitory soft forks for all initial implementations or abandoning the strategy altogether—might be more prudent. This stance reflects a contemplation of the practical and philosophical considerations inherent in evolving Bitcoin’s protocol through soft forks, highlighting the complexities of achieving consensus within its decentralized governance framework.