This selection process hinges on specific criteria known only to the potential hacker or a malicious manufacturer, such as the message and a device key. The uniqueness of each signature's leaked bits, facilitated by the substantial size of the checksum, significantly reduces the likelihood of overlap between any two signatures' leaked positions. Consequently, this strategy allows for the gradual reconstruction of the original secret as more bits of the checksum are exposed.

A question arises concerning the necessity of the attacker's knowledge or ability to guess which signatures share a common origin from the same seed, suggesting that without this insight, the attacker might face a combinatorial explosion. This point underscores the complexity of the attack methodology, highlighting the role of the transaction graph in potentially complicating or facilitating the attacker's efforts to correlate signatures to their seeds. The underlying implication is that while the technique presents a theoretically viable means of secret extraction, its practical execution may be contingent upon the attacker's capacity to navigate or circumvent the inherent challenges posed by the need for specific knowledge about the signatures' origins.