This variant aims to enhance security during the signing process, preventing potential exfiltration of private keys.

The proposed signing protocol begins with the signing device generating a hash from the private key, message, and nonce, denoted as q. This hash is then multiplied by the generator point G to produce Q. Subsequently, a new variable k is calculated by adding q to another hash generated from Q, the message, and the nonce. R is obtained by multiplying k by G, and e is derived from hashing R, the public key X, and the message. Depending on the signature scheme used, Schnorr or ECDSA, the signature is produced differently. For Schnorr, the signature s is computed by adding k to the product of the private key x and e. In the ECDSA approach, r is obtained from the x-coordinate of R, and s is calculated using k inverse, the message, and r times x.

After the signature generation, the signing device sends Q and s back to the wallet application. The wallet app then recalculates R using Q, the message, and the nonce, followed by combining them with G. It finally recalculates R and s for verification purposes. In the verification step for Schnorr signatures, e is re-derived using R, X, and the message, ensuring that the multiplication of s by G equals R plus the product of e and X. For ECDSA signatures, the verification checks whether the inversion of s multiplied by the message and G, added to the inversion of s multiplied by r and X, equals R.

This method provides a secure mechanism for signing transactions in an isolated environment, effectively mitigating risks associated with key exfiltration through its novel use of cryptographic operations and nonce incorporation.