bitcoin-dev

Mining pools, stratumv2 and oblivious shares

Mining pools, stratumv2 and oblivious shares

Original Postby Anthony Towns

Posted on: July 31, 2024 18:00 UTC

The discussion revolves around the complexities and potential solutions in managing decentralized mining pools, particularly focusing on the role of a trusted coordinator.

The trusted coordinator is essential for constructing templates, revealing secrets for valid blocks, managing funds, and validating work to ensure fairness and efficiency in the distribution of mining rewards. This necessity arises from the challenges of maintaining low payouts, frequent transactions, and the extensive validation work required by a widely distributed hash power.

For decentralization to be more effective, there might be considerations for a pool without a coordinator, especially if members have a significant minimum hashrate requirement, suggesting an upper limit to membership could facilitate better governance and security through identity-based measures and federated governance. However, this approach raises concerns about the feasibility and effectiveness compared to traditional centralized coordination, particularly regarding the management of shares and rewards.

The email further explores the concept of preventing block withholding in pools with coordinators, proposing a three-proof-of-work system to ensure fair share distribution and block validation. This system aims to mitigate the risks of withholding attacks by requiring additional work that validates shares at multiple levels, ensuring that all contributions are appropriately accounted for before a block is recognized as valid.

Additionally, the narrative touches upon the limitations of current strategies against block withholding attacks, highlighting the advantages larger miners might have under certain schemes and the potential adverse effects on competition and decentralization. It suggests that while novel approaches like combining shares for block validation may initially seem promising, they could inadvertently favor larger mining operations and exacerbate centralization issues.

The email also delves into the broader implications for the Bitcoin network's design, specifically the conflict between maintaining a progress-free mining process and the desire to proportionally distribute block finding chances according to hashrate. This dilemma underscores the inherent challenges in adjusting Bitcoin's consensus mechanism to address pooling and centralization concerns without compromising the network's foundational principles.

Finally, it acknowledges the long-term potential of zero-knowledge proofs in simplifying template validation but recognizes the technological and practical hurdles that need to be overcome. The current state of technology, including the need for widespread adoption of utreexo hashes and the computational intensity of generating proofs, presents significant barriers to implementing such solutions in the near term.