A more precise calculation based on the information from BOLT #3 indicates that the expected weight for a commitment transaction with one HTLC and anchors is approximately 324vB. This calculation serves to demonstrate the significant reduction in costs brought by version 3 (v3) of the protocol.

Further examination reveals the economic implications of pinning attacks in both v3 and non-v3 environments. Alice, willing to pay a fee rate of 162 sat/vB, would incur a cost of 50,868 sat for a minimum-sized commitment transaction. Conversely, an attacker like Mallory could exploit the system to inflate the replacement cost for Alice to 80,152 sat in a v3 context, resulting in an extra expense of 29,284 sat for Alice due to the attack. The disparity grows dramatically in a non-v3 scenario where the same attack could force Alice to pay an additional 7,949,284 sat, demonstrating the extent to which version 3 constrains the potential damage from pinning, aligning with claims of a hundredfold restriction.

These examples quantify the severity of pinning attacks and the protective benefits provided by v3 of the protocol. This detailed assessment underscores the importance of accurate transaction size estimations and the financial ramifications of protocol versions on transaction costs in the event of malicious activity.