P2share: how to turn any network (or testnet!) into a bitcoin miner

The revival of the "P2Pool" design introduces a novel approach to cryptocurrency mining by incorporating a separate "sharechain". This model is distinct from traditional P2Pool mechanisms, as it opts for randomly selecting a lucky shareholder to receive rewards, rather than distributing outputs evenly among all shareholders. This adjustment aims to address the scalability issues faced by the original P2Pool system, where the necessity for each contributing hasher to have an output on the coinbase proved unsustainable. However, this new method introduces its own set of challenges, particularly in maintaining the fundamental purpose of a mining pool—to evenly distribute rewards among cooperating miners based on their contributed hash power, thus managing the variable luck involved in mining activities.

Centralized non-P2Pool pools typically rely on a coordinator to aggregate the small shares of each miner and issue payments accordingly. This centralized coordination, however, can lead to potential censorship by the coordinator if they choose to discredit a miner's share for including unwanted transactions. To counteract this, there's a proposal for a Lightning-like mechanism that would allow for the aggregation of small payments without the need for HTLCs. Instead, a SCRIPT that can handle comparison of large 256-bit numbers is suggested, alongside a requirement for ZK-proof or similar technologies to ensure that transaction validity is maintained without pre-reveal to the coordinators, thereby preventing any undue censorship or payment denial.

Nonetheless, implementing such a solution within the Bitcoin framework may prove challenging due to technical limitations, such as the inability of current operations like OP_GREATERTHAN to handle 256-bit number comparisons, and the broader issue of BitVM's logic not aligning with the desired payment conditions. Moreover, the existing economic structure of Bitcoin, heavily influenced by large custodians, presents another significant barrier. These entities, which effectively act as centralized coordinators by holding miners' earnings, wield considerable power and may resist changes that could diminish their control or introduce non-custodial practices that threaten their dominance. This resistance is further exacerbated by misinformation campaigns that prioritize censorship—arguably the most significant advantage for custodians—over the adoption of innovations like OP_CTV that would support noncustodial arrangements and potentially democratize the mining process.