Fingerprinting nodes via addr requests

The discussion revolves around the challenges and potential strategies for mitigating specific network vulnerabilities, particularly focusing on the handling of timestamp information in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. A significant aspect of the challenge lies in the management of GETADDR results' timestamps, which are distributed over a broad timeframe of 30 days. The notion of introducing a slight random delay to these timestamps is critiqued for its potential ineffectiveness due to the extensive time range involved. An alternative suggestion proposes setting the timestamp for each address obtained from a GETADDR query to a randomized, fixed point in the past, specifically around 10 days with a variability of plus or minus 2 days, without relying on the original nTime information. This approach would necessitate a unique random value for each cache response.

Moreover, the conversation touches on the role of timestamps in the gossip relay mechanism, separate from GETADDR, utilized for node announcement propagation. This mechanism aims to ensure selective network-wide dissemination of node announcements to prevent flooding, achieved by forwarding addresses received in packages of size ten or less to one or two peers and restricting the forwarding timeframe to within 10 minutes of the original submission. The necessity of timestamps in this context is underscored, suggesting that altering timestamp handling in GETADDR responses might be a preferable strategy rather than a complete overhaul at the P2P level.

The discourse also references previous research conducted by the KIT group in response to the addr spam attack of 2021, providing insights into the exploration of timestamp manipulation as a mitigation technique. These studies are documented in publications available at IFCA AI and KIT's library, offering a foundational understanding of the subject matter and potential avenues for further investigation into efficient and secure timestamp management within P2P networks.