[Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards : preventing miner's deviation when the Bitcoin rewards is zero

The revision of the paper will incorporate an explicit limitation that acknowledges the results are contingent on the assumption of a non-reactive defender, aligning with the framework used by Budish (QJE 2024) and discussed in the Bonneau papers. This positioning is further supported by a contrasting perspective from Moroz et al. (2020), who introduce the concept of counter-forking as a form of deterrence by victims, suggesting a deviation from the assumed model.

The paper aims to present a conservative, worst-case scenario analysis, rather than predicting outcomes across the full spectrum of potential contest dynamics. This approach is intended to provide a grounded framework for understanding the limitations and implications of the current model under discussion.

Regarding the work of Budish, there was significant engagement with his findings, leading to the drafting of a rebuttal which, however, was not submitted for publication. Despite the depth of interaction with Budish's work, future research extending this model to include full capacity bidding games is not anticipated by the author due to personal reasons. This decision underscores the need for other researchers to explore these areas further. The hope expressed is that the outlined scope and limitations serve as a balanced foundation for ongoing dialogue and development within the scholarly community.