[Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards : preventing miner's deviation when the Bitcoin rewards is zero

In response to critical feedback regarding the scope and assumptions of a theoretical paper on mining profitability, the author acknowledges the validity of the suggestions but expresses reservations about immediately broadening the scope due to the potential complexity it introduces. The discussion hints at a possible redefinition of the paper's focus to explicitly state its conservative approach, ensuring readers are aware of its theoretical nature.

The paper in question makes several assumptions about mining dynamics that have been questioned for their realism and impact on security and cost-effectiveness. Specifically, it relies on a static model of mining which does not account for changes in hash rate behavior that could offer more flexibility and potentially enhance the model's applicability to real-world scenarios. This static approach, as noted, maximizes costs while possibly minimizing security by not adequately addressing the low cost of Sybil attacks under conditions where block creation is inexpensive.

Furthermore, the current security analysis within the paper primarily considers miner profitability as the main factor, somewhat neglecting other viable threats like Sybil attacks. While the author acknowledges the reality of such attacks, there is uncertainty about how to effectively integrate them into the model without overly generalizing the scope. The paper uses a rational player defense (RPD) methodology to analyze network security, which assumes economic incentives for attackers, a more contemporary and arguably realistic approach than models assuming non-economic adversarial intentions.

Overall, while the critique suggests integrating more dynamic elements and a broader view of security threats into the analysis, the author remains cautious about expanding the scope too quickly, indicating a preference for maintaining a narrower, more controlled focus in the research.