[Proposal] Public Fraud Proofs for Just-in-Time Channels

The proposal in question raises concerns regarding its practical benefits versus the complexities it introduces. Specifically, there is a potential issue in the outlined scheme where Alice could exploit a griefing vector after the second step. According to the current sequence, Alice possesses the capability to publish a fraud proof prematurely and subsequently delay the channel opening process, negatively impacting Bob's reputation. One suggested solution to mitigate this risk involves rearranging the procedural steps. It proposes that the entire flow, particularly the transmission of the UTXO commitment, should occur only after Alice sends the 'funding_signed' confirmation to Bob. This adjustment should ideally take place before Bob proceeds to broadcast the funding transaction. This reordering aims to prevent the premature exposure and misuse of sensitive transaction details, thereby safeguarding the integrity and reputation of the involved parties.