Posted by Antoine Riard
Sep 11, 2023/06:02 UTC
The email discusses the issue of participant non-interactivity in Zeeman 40, which has halted the actuary's R reveals. The concern is that a new off-chain state, N1', with a new negotiated group of 39 participants (excluding the 40th) may reuse the R reveals on N1, which poses a security risk to the actuary bond. To address this, the suggestion is that the R reveal should only occur once all the group participants have revealed their own signatures.Furthermore, it is mentioned that there seems to be an assumption of loose interactivity, where all non-actuary participants must be online simultaneously. The lack of contribution is attributed to a "flat" off-chain construction without layering of promised off-chain outputs in subgroups to reduce novation interactivity.On a more fundamental level, the email points out that the actuarial system does not solve the problem of "multi-party off-chain state correction" as there is no guarantee that the actuary will not slash the bond itself. Additionally, if the bond is guarded by users' public keys, there is no assurance that the user will cooperate after the actuary commits equivocation and signs a "fair" slashing transaction.In summary, the email highlights concerns regarding participant non-interactivity, security risks to the actuary bond, the assumption of loose interactivity, the lack of multi-party off-chain state correction, and uncertainties surrounding the actuary's actions and user cooperation.
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