Actuarial System To Reduce Interactivity In N-of-N (N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms

The email discusses the issue of ensuring lack of equivocation in an off-chain state. The sender suggests two possible solutions for this problem: updating the subgroup of balance keys on the blockchain or designing a fraud-proof system using OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK and the spent outpoint committed as a partial transaction template. In order to prevent equivocation, the sender proposes using fidelity bonds that are equal to the counterparty's initial balance multiplied by the remaining counterparties. For example, if there are 1000 participants with a balance of 10,000 satoshis, each participant must lock up 10,000,000 satoshis in fidelity bonds. Only a fraction of this amount can be used as an off-chain contract or payment.The sender also mentions that a pre-nominated coordinator can reduce the burden of the full fidelity bond, but it should be considered alongside the possibility of coordinator unavailability where each participant would have to withdraw their balance on-chain and bear the fee cost.Overall, the email suggests different approaches to address the issue of equivocation in an off-chain state, emphasizing the importance of fidelity bonds and considering the role of a coordinator in reducing the burden on participants.