Proposal for Quantum-Resistant Address Migration Protocol (QRAMP) BIP

The discourse underscores the imperative measures required by the Bitcoin ecosystem in response to the potential threat posed by quantum computing (QC) to its cryptographic foundations. The primary concern revolves around the vulnerability of existing Bitcoin signature schemes, including ECDSA and BIP340, to the theoretical capabilities of QC. The author argues for a preemptive approach, suggesting that the only viable solution to safeguard the cryptocurrency's value and integrity is through a soft fork. This modification would essentially disable the ability to transact with Bitcoin through these susceptible signature schemes before a cryptography-breaking QC materializes.

Further elaboration on the issue reveals the extensive risk faced by a significant portion of Bitcoin holdings. The visibility of millions of BTC through public keys due to various reasons—such as being locked in Pay to Public Key (P2PK) outputs, reuse of hashed addresses, or exposure via transactions on forked chains—exacerbates the situation. Additionally, a notable amount of Bitcoin in configurations known to limited parties (like multisig setups, lightning channels, and escrow services) also faces potential compromise, albeit not as publicly as the aforementioned cases.

Despite acknowledging the current absence of immediate danger, the necessity for proactive measures is emphasized. The alternative—failing to adapt to secure post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) protocols—poses an existential threat to Bitcoin. The concept of integrating PQC proofs of knowledge as a workaround for retaining spending capabilities in vulnerable schemes is mentioned, albeit recognized as a complex and not universally applicable solution. This perspective highlights the intricate balance between maintaining operational continuity and ensuring security within the evolving landscape of cryptocurrency and quantum computing.