Proposal for Quantum-Resistant Address Migration Protocol (QRAMP) BIP

The discussion around the management of old bitcoins in the face of emerging quantum computing capabilities delves into several nuanced positions. The suggestion to confiscate old coins is countered by a preference to allow those with access to quantum computers the opportunity to reintegrate these coins into circulation. This approach, although potentially inflationary for bitcoin's value, is seen as a temporary effect. Advocates for this method argue it aligns with the principles of those who have a low time preference, suggesting a forward-looking patience and willingness to see beyond immediate impacts.

Furthermore, the conversation touches upon the technical aspects of bitcoin addresses and the potential vulnerabilities to quantum attacks. It notes that the majority of bitcoin holdings are stored in addresses such as P2PKH, P2WPKH, P2SH, and P2WSH, which may not be immediately at risk. However, there is a concern for P2TR coins if Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) signatures, like those proposed in BIP-360, are not implemented. The dialogue includes a mention of strategies to protect large transactions from quantum attacks, recommending modifications to wallets that would allow them to interact with private mempool services like Slipstream, designed to limit exposure during transaction verification periods.

The notion of Bitcoin's "Q-day," a hypothetical point when quantum computing could significantly impact Bitcoin, is discussed as an event that will not occur abruptly but will instead unfold gradually. This anticipation implies that there will be time to prepare and adapt, including the potential for a soft fork activation to address these emerging challenges. Transparency is maintained with the acknowledgment of the speaker's involvement in developing a BIP-360 implementation for Anduro, highlighting the interconnected efforts of various entities within the MARA services to secure Bitcoin against quantum computing threats.