Giving teeth to expected EC disabling: P2XX(-T)(-ML)

Antoine raises concerns about the technical feasibility and security implications of disabling EC paths, such as those involved in miner lockdowns, through Pieter's proposed use of a tripwire mechanism. The proposal involves selecting a nothing-under-my-sleeve point to act as an automatic trigger for disabling new output types like P2MR. Antoine is skeptical about this approach, particularly because it introduces restrictions via a soft fork, limiting the validity space within the consensus information space with new verification rules.

The introduction of numerous hooks by P2TR, which are subsequently used by P2MR, creates potential vulnerabilities. Antoine speculates that a majority of miners could collude with CRQC actors to reintroduce a soft-fork, thereby re-enabling the validity of previously disabled EC paths. This would allow coins to be spent by these actors, undermining the security assumption that a majority of miners will always act in the long-term interest of the network. He argues that assuming miners will consistently act against their immediate economic interests is unrealistic and not a solid foundation for security.

Furthermore, Antoine acknowledges the proposal's attempt to limit the application of the tripwire disablement only to users who opt-in, thereby not enforcing new consensus rules on users who disagree. However, he remains critical of the overall strategy, pointing out the difficulties in ensuring a robust implementation of an EC disable path in a dynamic consensus environment. He points to the challenge of predicting future actions by a collective of miners and the practicality of designing a soft-fork that could reintroduce frozen coins. Antoine concludes by questioning the game-theoretical soundness of the proposal, given the possibility of economically rational miners colluding with powerful actors to bypass security measures if it becomes technically and economically feasible to do so.