Giving teeth to expected EC disabling: P2XX(-T)(-ML)

The discussion initiated by Boris Nagaev raises significant points about the implementation of Tripwire in relation to P2MR, P2TRv2, and P2TRH protocols. Boris appreciates the inclusion of an upper bound in these scenarios as it aligns with the expectations set by coin owners regarding lockdown periods. However, he expresses concerns regarding the Miner Lockdown feature, specifically the risk of false-positive activations where large-scale thefts—like those seen in historical incidents such as Milk Sad, Android SecureRandom in 2013, and LuBian 2020—could mistakenly trigger a CRQC event response. This misinterpretation could lead miners to lock the EC path even though it's just a conventional security breach.

Boris suggests that there should be a mechanism to reactivate the EC path if it turns out that the lockdown was triggered by a false alarm. He questions the extent of the disabling mechanism, asking whether it affects only the main EC path or includes all EC-related paths. This distinction is crucial because disabling only the main spending path while keeping hash-protected supplementary paths active could prevent legitimate operations from being unnecessarily halted. Boris's inquiry underscores the need for a nuanced approach to implementing security features in blockchain protocols, ensuring that they are robust enough to handle unexpected scenarios without disrupting normal operations. His suggestions aim to refine the balance between security and functionality within the cryptocurrency framework.