Giving teeth to expected EC disabling: P2XX(-T)(-ML)

The discussion about the implementation of a 192-bit quantum canary in cryptographic systems is complex and requires further research, particularly concerning its sensitivity to both quantum and classical attacks. The primary concern is estimating the timing between potential breaches of different security curves by quantum computers, specifically between secp192r1 and secp256k1. According to estimates based on Google's research on quantum computing, breaking secp192r1 would require approximately 900 logical qubits, while secp256k1 would need around 1200 logical qubits. This suggests a relatively small increase in qubit count from 900 to 1200, indicating that the first quantum computer capable of breaking secp192r1 might soon after be able to breach secp256k1 as well.

Further insights from the Quantum Canary Alert Protocol (QCAP) thread suggest simplifying the current approach to quantum threat detection. The use of DLEQAG proofs for sharing secrets among trusted groups could be considered excessive if the simple breakage of a 192-bit curve like secp192r1 could effectively signal an imminent quantum threat. A more straightforward implementation could involve publishing a canary proof based on secp192r1 directly on the blockchain. This method would allow nodes to activate the canary upon detecting the proof, without necessarily linking it to specific Bitcoin transactions such as UTXO spendings.

Detailed discussions and resources related to these cryptographic strategies and concerns can be found in the Google paper on quantum computing here, and the QCAP discussion thread here. These documents provide a foundational understanding and technical backing for advancing research in this critical area of cryptography and blockchain technology.