[Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards: preventing miner deviation as the block rewards approaches zero

The research identifies a critical threshold, denoted as G_t, which marks the point at which it becomes economically advantageous for miners to deviate from honest mining practices. This shift is attributed to the pursuit of profit maximization and occurs when the fee differential is just 0.17% of the transaction fees. Such a scenario is projected to become a practical concern as block rewards diminish through successive halvings.

The implications of this transition are explored further with simulations that highlight the conditions under which deviations might occur. It suggests that significant deviations could start becoming apparent around the year 2040, coinciding with a block subsidy reduction to approximately 0.195 BTC per block. This finding is pivotal for understanding the future dynamics of Bitcoin's security and economic stability.

For those interested in delving deeper into the subject, Lee's paper provides extensive analyses and is available for review at arxiv. Additionally, ongoing discussions and further modeling efforts can be accessed on Delving Bitcoin through links such as Research on Bitcoin Post-Block Rewards and Addressing Diminishing Block Subsidy. These platforms offer forums for feedback and critique, which are essential for refining the assumptions made in the study and enhancing its overall utility and realism.