The first counter, to_local, represents seller's funds that are not subjected to any leasing conditions. The second counter, to_local_leased, tracks the seller's leased funds. Lastly, to_local_leased_owed operates similarly to to_local_leased, but without accounting for pending HTLCs sent by the seller.

The handling of HTLCs—Hash Time-Locked Contracts—is central to this strategy. When the seller issues HTLCs, the amounts should be deducted from the to_local_leased fund initially and, upon depletion, then deducted from the to_local fund, ensuring that to_local_leased_owed remains unaffected. Conversely, when HTLCs are fulfilled, the amounts are reduced from to_local_leased_owed. Failed HTLCs, however, cause the funds to be returned to to_local_leased first, and once it equals to_local_leased_owed, any surplus is allocated back to to_local.

Commitment transactions must also be carefully constructed: if the to_local_leased balance exceeds the dust threshold, an output with a corresponding CLTV (CheckLockTimeVerify) should be created, signifying the leased nature of the funds. Similarly, if to_local is greater than dust, an output should be created without a CLTV lease. These processes are crucial during the sending and receiving of commit_sig messages, with updates being applied in a specific order: update_fulfill_htlc updates precede update_fail_htlc ones to ensure accurate updating of to_local_leased_owed.

Moreover, the system needs to accommodate concurrent leases, allowing multiple, overlapping leases to coexist within the same transactional framework. This increases the complexity and cost due to the additional outputs required in the commitment transactions, which sellers need to consider when deciding on funding leases. It's suggested that managing these concurrent leases could involve creating distinct to_local_leased_owed buckets for each lease, ordering them by their respective expiry dates to maintain fairness towards the buyer.

This approach is expected to address potential exploitations and maintain equitable transactions between participants. However, it requires thorough analysis to identify possible scenarios where cheating could occur, particularly concerning channel reserves and the implications of increased commitment transaction weights. The programmer invites colleagues to rigorously test this proposed system to ensure its integrity before implementation.