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SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories

SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories

Original Postby ZmnSCPxj

Posted on: October 9, 2024 01:05 UTC

The discussion surrounding the inversion of the timelock default in liquidity service provider (LSP) transactions introduces a novel approach to handling timeout defaults.

Traditionally, the timeout favored the LSP, but a proposed shift could redefine how disputes and unilateral closures are managed. By altering the structure of transaction outputs, the new method aims to obligate the LSP to bear the cost of unilateral exits initiated by dissatisfied clients. This change pivots from the previous model where an L & CLTV branch would determine fund distribution, toward a system where funds are directed to clients through an nLockTimed transaction. This transaction, which becomes effective at the timeout, ensures that clients have the potential to control the outcome more directly.

In this revised setup, each node output that would have led to a client channel is designed to include not just the value of the client's channel, but also any reserve requirements, the shares of other client channels, and the liquidity stock held by the LSP for sales purposes. The critical aspect of this structure is that it grants clients unilateral power to execute these alternate timeout transactions, thereby compelling the LSP to preemptively manage unilateral exits to avoid significant financial losses. This mechanism essentially forces the LSP to engage more actively in facilitating assisted exits, incentivizing them to prevent clients from reaching a point of choosing unilateral closure due to dissatisfaction.

Moreover, the strategy outlined provides a framework where the LSP is highly motivated to support assisted exits. For example, should feerates change significantly post an onchain assisted exit, a client can demand the LSP to re-sign the PTLC-claim transaction at a new rate. This creates an environment where the LSP, to avoid the costs associated with onchain fees for unilateral exits, has a vested interest in cooperating with clients during the exit process. The ability of the client to terminate the assisted exit process mirrors the choice of refusing one, pushing the LSP toward unilateral action if necessary. This restructuring of transaction output handling and the introduction of an nLockTimed alternative transaction signify a strategic shift intended to enhance fairness in the resolution of service disputes between clients and LSPs, ensuring that the LSPs are more accountable for the services provided.