Radpool opts for a fixed FROST signing federation comprised of share-buying entities, granting these entities control over block templates. Conversely, Braidpool advocates for a dynamic federation of miners, who also retain control over block template creation. This divergence in design philosophy reflects broader considerations about decentralization, censorship resistance, and the financialization of mining operations.

Braidpool's methodology seeks to democratize participation by allowing any miner who successfully mines a block to join its dynamic federation. This approach is juxtaposed against the more centralized model proposed by Radpool, where a select group of Market Service Providers (MSPs) determines membership within the signing federation and controls block template creation. The centralization risk associated with Radpool's structure could potentially make it easier for transaction censorship efforts to succeed due to the smaller number of entities involved. In contrast, Braidpool aims to disperse this power amongst a wider array of miners, thus bolstering censorship resistance by increasing the number of targets that must be compromised to influence block content.

Furthermore, the discussion highlights concerns regarding the practicality and legality of MSPs deciding on block templates, suggesting that such tasks may expose entities to legal risks in many jurisdictions. Both OCEAN and Braidpool propose shifting block template selection to individual miners as a countermeasure, which not only addresses these legal concerns but also avoids conflating share purchasing with block template decisions—a conflation present in today's centralized mining pools.

The conversation around share accounting mechanisms and payout systems—such as Pay Per Last N Shares (PPLNS)—underscores the complexity of creating fair and transparent economic incentives within mining pools. Braidpool proposes an innovative solution by equating its N parameter to the Bitcoin difficulty adjustment window, thereby simplifying hashrate derivatives' pricing and reducing the incentives for pool hopping, a behavior that can destabilize pool operations and rewards distribution.

Both proposals recognize the potential benefits of using Discreet Log Contracts (DLCs) for share buying, indicating a shared interest in leveraging novel cryptographic solutions to improve the fairness and efficiency of mining pool operations. Despite the differences, there's a willingness to collaborate, particularly in sharing advancements in FROST signing technology and possibly integrating share accounting methodologies.

Finally, the discourse addresses misconceptions surrounding miner autonomy within the Braidpool system, emphasizing that miners would not require permission to exit the pool or access their payouts, thus preserving operational independence. It also touches upon the security implications of FROST signing and the importance of having a diverse signing federation composed of both miners and share-buyers to ensure balanced governance and operational integrity.

For those interested in the technical and philosophical nuances of decentralized mining pool design, further information and discussions will be available during the Blockchain Commons meeting, where Kulpreet Singh will present his work on FROST federations. Interested parties are encouraged to join the Blockchain Commons meeting on Dec 4 for more insights.