The sender acknowledges the lack of strong evidence regarding the feasibility of such an attack, stating that while it seems difficult to accomplish due to the multiple independent bitcoin nodes that lightning nodes operate, the exact level of difficulty is hard to quantify.

A consideration is made for the need to transmit HTLC (Hashed Time-Locked Contract) signatures prior to the commitment signature, suggesting that the introduction of PTLCs (Point Time-Locked Contracts) might be an appropriate time to address this issue. The sender refers to a previous write-up that details the exchange of partial signatures necessary for PTLC implementation, indicating that the existing system could be maintained until then by utilizing simple mitigations like monitoring the mempool for preimage discovery.

Furthermore, the email discusses the risk of griefing attacks, where a malicious actor could potentially disrupt channel funds access. To mitigate such risks, lightning node operators are advised to configure their max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat settings to limit exposure. Although the solution may not be entirely satisfying, it is deemed adequate for practical purposes in the interim, with the expectation that a more permanent fix will be implemented in the future.