Ephemeral Anchors and MEVil

Ephemeral Anchors and MEVil

Original Postby Crypt-iQ

Posted on: February 19, 2024 18:46 UTC

The discussion revolves around the financial dynamics within a specific transactional framework, highlighting the strategic incentives for parties to manipulate transaction costs for their benefit.

The core issue addressed is the economic advantage gained by a party controlling transaction TxB in choosing to pay 1,780 satoshis (sats) above the base cost associated with an ephemeral anchor spend to evict another transaction, TxC, from the system. This action contrasts with the alternative of initiating a separate transaction that would necessitate a payment exceeding 10,000 sats as per a predefined rule, thereby presenting a cost-effective strategy for influencing the transactional landscape.

In addressing potential solutions to the outlined problem, the conversation shifts towards the procedural aspects of managing transaction outputs and fees. A proposed method involves initiating transactions with zero-value outputs as a foundational step. This approach aims to simplify the transactional process, especially in the context of pre-cluster mempool environments. Further elaboration on this strategy suggests the incorporation of an anyone-can-spend output equipped with a timelock set far into the future. Such a design choice is posited as a means to prevent interference with mempool operations while maintaining the commitment transaction's fee at zero. This nuanced strategy underscores the technical considerations necessary for optimizing transaction management within the discussed framework.