This scenario poses a significant risk as it would enable these miners to secure a large portion of the block reward without completing the requisite proof of work (PoW). This problem is identified as being potentially more detrimental than the known strategy of block withholding.

To mitigate this issue, one proposed measure involves the verification of every template by either the pool itself or a distinct Job Declarator server entity (JDS). However, this solution presents challenges due to differences in the mempool of the JDS node compared to the miner's, necessitating a process where transactions within the JDS mempool might need replacement to align with those in the template. Such an adjustment aims to identify and exclude transactions with unfeasibly high fees that are not executable. Verification becomes particularly complex for coinbase-only templates, where the JDS lacks visibility into the transactions involved, complicating the distinction between malicious actions by miners versus those by pools.

A simpler suggested approach to address the fabrication of block templates with inflated fees proposes capping the fees for all slices to the fee levels found within the successfully mined block. This solution assumes that any undetected fake templates would subsequently have their fee levels adjusted to realistic figures, similar to what could have been legitimately found, thereby reducing the incentive for creating templates containing high-value, undisclosed transactions. This method also encourages the sharing of beneficial transactions across the mempools of all template providers, fostering a more equitable mining environment.