The core issue revolves around the necessity for MSPs to agree on the division of shares and the rate at which these shares are contributed, which is crucial for determining the correct payment distribution. This requires a mechanism by which MSPs can prove their hash rate contribution to one another, a solution that remains unspecified. Without such a proof, the system risks becoming unmanageable due to the excessively high message rate that would result from broadcasting all minor shares.

Furthermore, the system under scrutiny appears to allow MSPs to act as centralized pools for their miners without any effective means of verifying the hash rate claimed by the MSP. This lack of accountability enables MSPs to potentially deceive individual miners regarding their actual hash rate contributions. Although this model may offer the benefit of reducing variance in mining outcomes, it introduces significant drawbacks compared to existing protocols like OCEAN with DATUM, notably the increased risk of transaction censorship given MSPs' role in block creation and the absence of direct accountability of miners to their MSPs.

The critique suggests that while the proposed system aims to improve upon the current state of affairs by mitigating variance, it ultimately represents a regression in terms of transparency and trustworthiness relative to other models, particularly concerning the potential for MSP manipulation and lack of miner oversight. The unresolved questions highlight the need for further clarification and development to address these fundamental issues.