The argument for the fork was initially supported by three main points: the enhancement of block hash malleation detection, the perceived Distributed Denial of Service (DoS) protection benefits derived from caching invalid block hashes, and the aim to establish a block hash as a unique identifier for blocks.

However, these arguments were critically evaluated and found lacking in substantiation. Firstly, the current system already allows for the detection of malleated block messages without necessitating extensive parsing beyond the coinbase transaction's input point. This counters the claim that the fork would significantly improve early detection capabilities. Secondly, the strategy of caching invalid block hashes as a DoS mitigation measure was criticized. It was argued that this approach does not effectively protect against DoS attacks but rather exposes nodes to potential disk fill attacks, similar to vulnerabilities seen in recent banning incidents. This critique challenges the perceived benefit of caching invalid block hashes as a protective measure against DoS attacks. Lastly, the goal of using a block hash to uniquely identify a block was deemed unattainable due to the persistence of duplicated transaction hash malleation issues.

Despite these criticisms, the possibility of optimizing SPV implementations through the proposed fork remains a topic worth considering. The initial rejection of the proposal based on the aforementioned arguments does not preclude the exploration of other meaningful objectives that could arise from discarding invalid arguments. The conversation underscores the importance of clear objective setting in technological innovations, particularly in the context of blockchain development, where efficiency and security are paramount. The dialogue reflects a balanced view on the proposal, acknowledging both its shortcomings and potential merits in the ongoing effort to optimize blockchain technology.