Initially, it critiques the method of addressing security flaws by merely adding a piece of documentation rather than altering the API to prevent insecure practices. This method was deemed insufficient as it relied on users finding and understanding this documentation amidst potentially contradictory examples elsewhere. The critique is rooted in a belief that secure usage should be intuitive and not relegated to an easily overlooked document.

Further, the discussion shifts to a specific issue with Bitcoin’s merkle trees, which are fundamental for generating cryptographically secure transaction inclusion proofs. Despite the recognition of their insecurity among protocol developers, the knowledge of this flaw and its solutions has not been widely disseminated, leaving it as an obscure problem. The writer posits that relying on limited documentation to address such critical vulnerabilities is inadequate and runs the risk of attributing any resultant financial losses to user incompetence.

The argument culminates in advocating for a consensus change to restore the original security and simplicity of the protocol. Such a change would ensure that generating and verifying transaction inclusion proofs is both intuitive and secure, aligning with the principle that security fixes should enhance the protocol's inherent security rather than rely on external documentation for safe usage. The perspective presented underscores a commitment to foundational security principles and the importance of accessible, secure design in cryptographic protocols.