Eclipsing Bitcoin Nodes with BGP Interception Attacks

The correspondence delves into the complexities surrounding network level attacks on Bitcoin, emphasizing the potential mitigation effects of BIP324 and StratumV2. It highlights an area ripe for further exploration regarding the use of alternative connection types like Tor or I2P in either exacerbating or mitigating such attacks, contingent upon the configuration of entry guards throughout the attack duration. The discussion raises questions about the clarity of attack methodologies described, suggesting improvements for distinguishing between traditional and proposed new styles of attack strategies.

The sender critiques the assumption of a worst-case scenario in the analysis, advocating for a more nuanced approach that includes preliminary probing of the Bitcoin network to inform more strategic choices in prefix attacks. This perspective challenges the pessimistic view of hijack feasibility, pointing out the potential oversimplification of prefix hijacking success rates without considering additional network filters and customer relationships that could thwart such attempts. The email also expresses interest in accessing an AS relationship dataset from CAIDA, hinting at its relevance to the research.

Furthermore, the message proposes examining the correlation between ping response times and the physical proximity of nodes as a possible alternative to relying solely on traceroutes for detecting connection hijacks. It underscores the dynamic nature of peer connections, suggesting ongoing monitoring to identify and respond to route changes, thereby enhancing the resilience against eclipse attacks through strategic peer rotation. The potential for tunneling to complicate detection efforts is noted, alongside the utility of traceroute in identifying outbound connection hijacks, with a call for developing a decision-making framework to address detected anomalies.

The author advocates for raising awareness among node operators and Bitcoin infrastructure providers about network attack vulnerabilities, urging them to select hosting services with robust security features such as tight ROAs and ASPA adoption. The absence of ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) in the conversation is pointed out as a significant oversight, given its capacity to substantially hinder attack efforts even with limited deployment. The correspondence suggests collaboration with entities like Bitcoin Optech to disseminate knowledge on protective measures and encourages quantifying the impact of ASPA's current and future adoption on mitigating network level attacks. This, combined with the recommendation to favor peers within protected prefixes, outlines a comprehensive strategy for enhancing Bitcoin's resilience to such threats.