Stealth addresses using nostr

The mention of Cashu wallets adopting a similar approach brings to light instances where relays have intentionally deleted their databases, highlighting a significant risk in relying solely on Nostr for critical data storage. Although there is no direct incentive for relays to delete events, the lack of disincentives coupled with potential storage constraints might encourage the deletion of older notes, posing a threat to data integrity.

The conversation also touches upon the challenges associated with metadata leaks, which are purportedly addressed only in NIP 4, leaving uncertainties about other potential vulnerabilities. The limited adoption of NIP-17, especially if its primary application involves Stealth Addresses, suggests a persistent risk of metadata leakage, undermining user privacy. The email speculates on the existence of common relays shared by different wallets, which could theoretically facilitate transactions between users like Alice and Bob by leveraging shared network paths or hops. This scenario underscores the inherent privacy risks and the complex dynamics of relay networks within the Nostr ecosystem.