Concept Review: B-SSL (Bitcoin Secure Signing Layer) — Covenant-Free Vault Model Using Taproot, CSV, and CLTV

This design is aimed at self-custody, leveraging existing Bitcoin primitives such as Taproot, CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY, and CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY to address the issue of permanent key loss while ensuring on-chain enforceability without the need for covenants. The B-SSL framework outlines three distinct spending paths to secure Bitcoin transactions: a user-initiated path requiring either (A or A₁) + C after a configurable period ranging from 2 hours to 15 days, a fallback recovery path allowing A + B to spend after 1 year, and a custodian recovery or inheritance safeguard that permits (B or B₁) + C to spend after 3 years. Notably, A₁ and B₁ serve as mirrored backups for A and B, respectively. An optional off-chain "Convenience Service" can be employed to introduce delays and send secret notifications as a protective measure against physical threats or coercion. The whitepaper detailing the B-SSL concept is available for peer review and discussion on GitHub, with the objective of gathering feedback regarding its Miniscript structure, policy expressiveness, and operational safety. Madonna contrasts B-SSL with an existing system highlighted in a Miniscript template (mint-005), which focuses on joint custody coordination, making it suitable for institutional funds sharing. However, he points out that mint-005 does not address the critical issue of key loss in non-custodial setups. In contrast, B-SSL aims to offer a sovereign vault solution equipped with human fail-safes, positioning it as an ideal choice for individuals and companies seeking to maintain control over their keys without the risk of losing them, marking a potential breakthrough for Bitcoin's future.