On the possibility of evil covenants and implications for soft fork proposals

The discourse challenges the notion that innovations requiring consensus changes should first prove their necessity through emulation, using multisig oracles as a surrogate. This perspective is critiqued through the lens of the Lightning Network and its reliance on CLTV/CSV for deployment. The argument suggests that had the same requirement been enforced, the development and adoption of the Lightning Network might have been significantly hindered. It raises questions about the feasibility of securing investment and building prototypes under such constraints, highlighting Lightning Labs as a potential example of a project that could have struggled in this alternate scenario.

Furthermore, the text references the use of this argument against the demand for vaults, pointing out that while Revault attempted to create a multisig-based solution, it ultimately did not succeed due to the complexity and limitations imposed by the lack of consensus support. This example serves to underline the argument that certain applications cannot achieve their full potential or meet user demands without direct changes to consensus mechanisms. The mention of companies like AnchorWatch, Anchorage, NYDIG, and River underscores the existing demand for consensus-driven solutions, specifically vaults in this context.

The final part advocates for the deployment of soft fork proposals that are straightforward to assess for safety, benefit from mature implementations, and enjoy broad demand and potential utility, akin to the deployment of CLTV. The author argues against the hesitancy to adopt new technologies due to the absence of more cumbersome, multisig-enabled alternatives, suggesting that such reluctance could stifle innovation and fail to address market needs effectively.