Latency and Privacy in Lightning

The discussion between programmers highlights the intricacies of handling privacy and latency measurements within BOLT12, particularly concerning blinded paths. The key takeaway is that concerns regarding privacy breaches through BOLT12 are mitigated by the procedure where the introduction point eliminates attribution data. This process inadvertently affects latency measurements along the blinded path; these measurements appear exaggerated as they encapsulate the entire path's latency, rendering them impractical for accurate scoring. This revelation underscores the necessity to overlook such latency reports in performance evaluations.

Further examination reveals that both trampoline and legacy nodes contribute to the stripping of attribution data. Consequently, this limitation ensures that only data from hops preceding these nodes can be used for measuring performance, introducing a significant gap in the monitoring capabilities of the network. Moreover, the inability to distinguish between the penultimate hop and the final recipient complicates the assignment of responsibility for delays, suggesting that blame or penalties cannot feasibly be attributed to specific nodes towards the end of the path.

In light of these discussions, there emerges a consensus on the approach towards hold time reporting and scoring methodologies. Given the inherent restrictions imposed by BOLT12 and the architecture of blinded paths, it appears prudent to limit hold time reporting to the initial segments of a path. This measure not only aligns with privacy preservation goals but also acknowledges the technical limitations in attributing delays accurately across the network. The dialogue culminates in the proposition that establishing best practices around exempting receiver-side delays from sender-side scoring could mitigate potential issues, thereby suggesting a nuanced understanding of the balance between network efficiency and individual privacy.