Best-(Worst-)Case MEVil Response

Miner Extractable Value (MEV) emerges as a concept where financial incentives drive miners to utilize advanced technology for optimizing the value of transactions included in a forthcoming block. The notion of MEVil specifically refers to practices that exploit this concept to the detriment of layer 2 (L2) counterparties or through manipulation that undermines the efficiency and fairness of block construction. The definition of "sophisticated technology" remains ambiguous, raising questions about what qualifies as advanced enough to be considered under this term. For instance, whether the application of high school level integral calculus for block template creation falls into this category is debatable.

The proposal of a "mevpool marketplace" standard aims to address the issues surrounding MEV by replacing accelerator/private mempool services. This marketplace would allow miners to continue acting as block "builders" while enabling end users or specialized third parties to bid directly for the inclusion of individual transactions. Such marketplaces would feature order books with bids characterized by various properties, including transaction position within blocks and specific smart contract restrictions. However, concerns arise regarding the real-time reception of block templates from marketplace operators and the verification of these templates' integrity, particularly in terms of feerate by weight unit.

Critique extends to proposed solutions for ensuring the authenticity and integrity of block templates. Traditional mechanisms like bank letters of credit and Bitcoin-script based escrows are deemed unrealistic for timely dispute resolution given the inherent delays in blockchain transaction confirmations. Additionally, employing Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) for block templating is criticized for introducing excessive latency due to kernel context switches, suggesting a need for innovation in commitment attestation schemes that align with the native support on enclave hardware.

In conclusion, while the problem of MEV and its potentially harmful variant, MEVil, is acknowledged as significant, the effectiveness of suggested remedies is questioned. The discussion highlights the complexity of achieving equitable and efficient transaction inclusion mechanisms in blockchain environments, indicating that current solutions may not adequately mitigate the challenges posed by MEV.