Minimal signing flow changes for TRUC channels

The discussion revolves around a complex issue within a specific scenario involving Alice and Bob, two participants in a transaction. The core of the problem lies in the handling of a commitment transaction related to a Hashed Time-Locked Contract (HTLC), which is a type of payment mechanism used in blockchain technologies to enforce certain conditions before a transaction can be completed.

In this scenario, Bob has forwarded an incoming HTLC that remains unresolved. This situation raises concerns about the efficacy of Alice's commitment transaction. Although this transaction includes a valid signature from Bob, it lacks a mechanism for Bob to claim the second stage of the HTLC-Success transaction. This absence is critical because, for anti-pin reasons, this transaction would need to be pre-signed.

The crux of the debate centers on whether adding a signature on an old commitment transaction could address this dilemma. The argument against this solution suggests that Alice could still proceed to verify the new commitment transaction on the blockchain without a signed second-stage HTLC transaction. Consequently, Bob would find himself unable to resolve the transaction successfully.

This conversation highlights the intricate challenges involved in designing secure and efficient mechanisms for executing transactions on blockchain platforms. It underscores the need for careful consideration of how transactions are structured and verified to ensure that all parties have the means to complete their respective parts of a deal.