Perpetually KYC'd Coins Using Evil Covenants

The challenge of securing large transactions against attackers is notably significant for institutions which prioritize the safeguarding of substantial sums. The implementation of Transport Layer Security (TLS) on government websites exemplifies a robust security measure, primarily due to the ability to easily revoke TLS certificates in the event of a key being lost or compromised. This level of security management contrasts sharply with the issues surrounding co-signing keys, which become problematic once they are integrated into millions of Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs). Unlike co-signing keys, the flexibility and security offered by TLS illustrate a more adaptable approach to safeguarding data.

Furthermore, the introduction of technologies such as CAT, EXPIRE, and CSFS proposes an infrastructure that mirrors TLS, embracing concepts like certificate authorities. This advancement suggests a pathway towards achieving a comparable level of security and revocation capabilities within different contexts beyond traditional web security. Such developments indicate a move towards creating environments where security can be dynamically managed and adjusted according to emerging threats or vulnerabilities, thereby offering a more resilient framework against potential security breaches.