BMAX: pricing “sats now vs sats later” via a mining sharechain (no L1 changes, no custodians, no oracles)

The focus is on how shares within this system are managed, particularly in relation to mining difficulty and rewards distribution. The critique points out that the current proposal deviates from the original concept by not burning shares, which could lead to an inflationary scenario and data bloat due to an ever-growing utxoset. The absence of share burning is seen as a departure from the previous model that might have included a FIFO (First In, First Out) queue mechanism for managing mining rewards, which would keep the system deflationary and more akin to pool mining rather than solo mining.

The critic suggests that maintaining some form of a FIFO queue, or a similar concept, alongside burning the shares that get selected for rewards, could enhance the project's appeal by attracting more miners. This approach contrasts with the currently described method, which appears to allocate rewards based on random selection or possibly to the ten largest shareholders, aiming to incentivize accumulation of shares among top participants while potentially discouraging broader participation.

Moreover, the critique highlights concerns regarding the practicality of managing an infinite and unburned share database, suggesting that such a system might be unsustainable. The suggestion to revert to mechanisms that encourage share burning, whether through a FIFO system or a hybrid model involving both random payouts and FIFO mechanisms, aims to address these issues. Additionally, the creation of transferable shares is acknowledged as a complex feature but one that could add depth to the market dynamics by allowing share trading.

Finally, the feedback touches upon the need for a design that encourages miners to consolidate their shares into as few addresses or utxos as possible to maximize their chances of winning in a system where payments might prioritize those with the most shares. This idea contrasts with a random draw mechanism, which could lead to a fragmented utxoset. The critique implies that despite the challenges and potential drawbacks of the proposed changes, incorporating features that attract solo miners and effectively manage the share ecosystem could make the initiative more viable and appealing.