Hybrid Jamming Mitigation: Results and Updates

The discussion revolves around the intricacies of a sink attack against a graph centered on the acinq node, highlighting how an attacker manipulates their reputation over a 90-day period before initiating an onslaught. The fluctuation in the attacker's reputation delta is notable, suggesting that it may result from variations in the target node's incoming revenue or perhaps due to the randomness associated with endorsed payments directed towards the attacker. It's suggested that to mitigate such variance, attackers could adopt a more straightforward approach by sending themselves a payment of the maximum amount endorsable post-reputation build-up.

Furthermore, the dialogue touches upon the concept of bi-directional reputation within this context, emphasizing its utility in ensuring compensation at both ends of the channel involved in the attack. This system seemingly allows for both the attacking and receiving ends to build up necessary reputations with their respective targets and peers, proposing a way to ensure all parties in the direct line of the attack are compensated. However, this raises concerns regarding intermediate nodes within the jamming path, which, despite being crucial to the attack's execution, do not receive compensation under the current reputation algorithm, thereby questioning its effectiveness in fully addressing victim compensation.

An exploration into the Path-Length Attack Multiplier unveils a deeper problem where the number of intermediate nodes directly correlates with the magnitude of the attack's impact. Specifically, the attacker's cost remains constant regardless of the route's length, enabling a disproportionate escalation in damage inflicted. In extreme scenarios, attackers can exploit this by routing endorsed payments across a vast network of up to 27 hops or utilizing circular routing to intensify the damage through a smaller cluster of target nodes. This strategy significantly amplifies the potential for jamming and reputation harm, manifesting a challenge in curbing the effectiveness of such attacks within the discussed framework.